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ShUTTiNG oFF The SchooL-To-PriSoN PiPeLiNe
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Children from low-income and minority families disproportionately populate the 
juvenile court, as well as juvenile shelter care, detention, and incarceration facilities.1 
Less obvious, but equally intense, is the concentration in the juvenile system of children 
with undiagnosed and unmet special education needs.2 For many special education 
eligible children swept into the school-to-prison pipeline, a pivotal point is a status 
offense charge for truancy, ungovernability, or running away.3 The “school-to-prison 
1. See, e.g., Joy G. Dryfoos, Adolescents at Risk: Prevalence and Prevention 39 tbl.3.7 (1991) 
(describing low economic status as a “major predictor” of adolescent delinquency); Jerome G. Miller, 
Last One Over the Wall: The Massachusetts Experiment in Closing Reform Schools 3–5 
(1991); National Council on Crime and Delinquency, And Justice for Some: Differential 
Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice System 6–30 (2007), available at http://nccd-crc.
issuelab.org/research/listing/and_justice_for_some_differential_treatment_of_youth_of_color_in_
the_justice_system (presenting data showing disproportionate representation of minority youth at all 
stages of the juvenile justice process); Michael J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) 
of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, 48 Crime & Delinq. 3, 14–19 (2002) 
(assessing how states have addressed the federal DMC mandate); cf. Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report 9 (2006) 
[hereinafter OJJDP, National Report], available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/nr2006/index.html 
(reporting that nearly one-third of black juveniles live below the poverty line); Martha J. Coutinho & 
Donald P. Oswald, Disproportionate Representation in Special Education: A Synthesis and Recommendations, 
9 J. Child & Fam. Stud. 135, 135–56 (2000) (summarizing the current consensus on disproportionate 
representation of minorities in special education).
2. See David Osher et al., Schools Make a Difference: The Overrepresentation of African American Youth in 
Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, in Racial Inequity in Special Education 93, 99–100 
(Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002) (concluding that the educational system is allowing 
children with or at risk for emotional disturbance to be funneled into the juvenile justice system rather 
than supporting their emotional, behavioral, and educational needs); Robert B. Rutherford, Jr. et 
al., Youth with Disabilities in the Correctional System: Prevalence Rates and 
Identification Issues 7–19 (2002), available at http://cecp.air.org/juvenilejustice/docs/Youth%20
with%20Disabilities.pdf (reviewing and describing the prevalence of disabilities in detained youth); Sue 
Burrell & Loren Warboys, Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, Juv. Just. Bull., July 2000, 
at 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/179359.pdf [hereinafter Burrell & Warboys, 
Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System] (“A significant proportion of youth in the juvenile justice 
system have education-related disabilities and are eligible for special education and related services . . . .”); 
Peter E. Leone et al., Understanding the Overrepresentation of Youths with Disabilities in Juvenile Detention, 
3 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 389 (1995) (collecting citations on the prevalence of disabilities among 
incarcerated youth); Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Identify, Accommodate, 
and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their Disproportionate Representation in the 
Delinquency System, 3 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 3, 4 n.2 (2003) [hereinafter Tulman, 
Disability and Delinquency]; Clyde A. Winters, Learning Disabilities, Crime, Delinquency and Special 
Education Placement, 32 Adolescence 451 (1997) (noting that between 28% and 43% of incarcerated 
youth require special education services); see also National Council on Disability, Addressing the 
Needs of Youth with Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System: The Current Status of 
Evidence-Based Research 11–12 (2003) [hereinafter NCD], available at http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroom/publications/pdf/juvenile.pdf (noting the high prevalence of learning disabilities and serious 
emotional disturbance among incarcerated youth and generally weak research regarding prevalence of 
children with disabilities in the delinquency system).
3. Status offense charges are distinguished from delinquency charges. Delinquency charges are charges for 
behavior that is criminal for both children and adults over the age of majority. See, e.g., David J. 
Steinhart, Status Offenses, 6 The Future of Children 86, 86 (1996) (“A status offense is behavior that 
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pipeline” represents the ways in which the failures of school systems to educate our 
children contribute to the increase in the juvenile justice and adult prison population.4
 State and federal law and policy favor keeping children with their families,5 
mainstreaming special education students with non-disabled peers,6 and 
deinstitutionalizing status offenders.7 Although status offender diversion programs 
are designed to be a catalyst for children’s integration into the community and a 
bulwark against exclusion, children identified as status offenders often find themselves 
in court proceedings and ultimately in restrictive placements, out of their schools, 
and out of their homes. Thus, pushing children with undiagnosed and unmet special 
is unlawful for children, even though the same behavior is legal for adults.”). Underage drinking is also 
a status offense. Not surprisingly, children with disabilities are more likely to develop substance abuse 
problems. See James R. Gress & Marion S. Boss, Substance Abuse Differences Among Students Receiving 
Special Education School Services, 26 Child Psychiatry & Hum. Dev. 235, 244 (1996) (“[S]ignificant 
differences in substance abuse among special education students were identified for each grade level.”); 
Jeffrey S. Kress & Maurice J. Elias, Substance Abuse Prevention in Special Education Populations: Review 
and Recommendations, 27 J. Spec. Educ. 35, 38–39 (1993) (reviewing literature on prevalence of 
substance abuse in the special education population).
4. In this way, the concept is both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in that there are empirical 
connections between schools and law enforcement. See Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen, Defining and 
Redirecting a School-to-Prison Pipeline, in 99 New Directions for Youth Development: 
Deconstructing the School-to-Prison Pipeline 9 (Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen eds., 2003) 
(presenting empirical evidence of the pipeline and policies to address it). It is normative in that these 
empirical connections represent both moral and legal failures. See Advancement Project et al, 
Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track 15–19 (2005), available at http://
www.ncscatfordham.org/binarydata/files/FINALEOLrep.pdf (describing how zero tolerance policies fail 
children and increase disproportionate minority representation). Part of the failure of schools to educate 
children can be seen in the high dropout rate among minority students. See Gary Orfield et al., Losing 
Our Future: How Minority Youth Are Being Left Behind by the Graduation Rate Crisis 2 
(2004) (noting a 50.2% graduation rate among black students and a 68% graduation rate among all students 
nationwide); cf. Children’s Defense Fund, America’s Cradle to Prison Pipeline 3 (2007) (“At 
crucial points in [poor children’s] development, from birth through adulthood, more risks and disadvantages 
cumulate and converge that make a successful transition to productive adulthood significantly less likely 
and involvement in the criminal justice system significantly more likely.”).
5. The Uniform Law Commissioners’ Model Juvenile Court Act of 1968, the blueprint for state laws on 
child welfare, delinquency, and status offense matters, requires “achiev[ing] the . . . purposes [of the 
Act] in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from his parents only when 
necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety.” Model Juvenile Ct. Act § 1(3) (Unif. Law 
Comm’rs 1968) [hereinafter Model Act].
6. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) contains a requirement for placing children 
with disabilities in the “least restrictive environment.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006); see also infra Part 
III.A.3.
7. The legislative history of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (“JJDPA”) is 
clear on this point. See S. Rep. No. 93–1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283 (“These 
[juvenile] status offenders generally are inappropriate clients for the formal police courts and corrections 
process of the juvenile justice system. These children and youth should be channeled to those agencies 
and professions which are mandated [and in] fact purport to deal with the substantive human and social 
issues involved in these areas.”). See generally Claire Shubik & Jessica Kendall, Rethinking Juvenile Status 
Offense Laws: Considerations for Congressional Review of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act, 45 Fam. Ct. Rev. 384 (2007) (discussing the deinstitutionalization policy of the JJDPA and the 
way in which Congress later created a loophole in the policy).
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education needs into the status offense system runs contrary to federal policy and is 
ultimately counterproductive.
 Special education law can be instrumental in shutting down the pipeline in two 
ways. To begin, children who receive appropriate special education services can avoid 
the sorts of behaviors—like unruliness in school and ungovernability at home —that 
lead to status offense charges. Prevention and early intervention are, self-evidently, 
superior approaches. Special education law provides for early intervention and 
preventive services while maintaining youth in their own home and in the community. 
Schools have a legal obligation to identify students with special education needs and 
to provide them with individualized services to address those needs.8 Appropriate 
implementation of federal special education mandates that identify and serve youth 
with special education needs can go a long way toward preventing youth from being 
caught up in the school-to-prison pipeline.
 The second instrumental use of special education law can come about because 
some youth do get caught up in the school-to-prison pipeline. A child facing status 
offense charges is likely to be a child for whom school system personnel failed to 
provide appropriate special education services, and with whom parents have become 
increasingly frustrated. As such, an attorney should use that failure in conjunction 
with a well-grounded understanding of federal special education law as a key 
component of the defense strategy.
 Additionally, the defense attorney should offer to help the child and the child’s 
parents obtain appropriate special education services to address the child’s needs, to 
stabilize the family, and to extricate the child from the status offense system. Effective 
use of special education advocacy can insulate a child from the juvenile court, 
re-establish the child in school, and help to stabilize a family in crisis.9
 This article aims to provide a practical and theoretical guide to attorneys 
representing status offenders who have education-related disabilities. Part II examines 
how the failure to follow federal special education law creates some of the plumbing 
in the school-to-prison pipeline. Part II examines how child advocates and their 
clients can use special education law to extricate children from the status offense 
system and begin to reverse and ultimately help shut down the pipeline.10 Toward 
this end, Part III also provides advocates with a broad overview of federal special 
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1) (2009) (“child find” provision); 20 
U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006) (defining free appropriate education).
9. Another, more literal pay-off is that a prevailing parent in a special education matter is entitled to 
attorneys’ fees at a reasonable (i.e., market) rate. Court-appointed attorneys who represent low-income 
clients in status offense cases, therefore, might find that special education advocacy better serves their 
clients’ interests, as well as their own. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)–(C) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a)
(1)(i), (c) (2006) (describing circumstances in which parents of children with disabilities or state agencies 
can receive reasonable attorneys’ fees in the court’s discretion).
10. For a detailed description of how the failure of adults to follow special education law leads to the 
disproportionate representation of children with disabilities in the delinquency system, see Tulman, 
Disability and Delinquency, supra note 2; see also Dean H. Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: 
Litigating School Exclusion, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 265, 266–69 (2008) (describing the many ways in which 
schools exclude students, including students with education-related disabilities). See generally supra note 2.
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education law and policy and its relationship with the state statutory requirements of 
the juvenile court. Finally, Part IV describes the extensive services and behavioral 
interventions that are available through special education law in contrast with the 
interventions available through the juvenile court. Part IV will show that the only 
intervention not available through special education law is incarceration and that 
problems that potentially lead to status offense cases are most effectively addressed 
with special education services rather than through the juvenile court.
ii.  statUs OffEndErs With UnMEt spECiaL EdUCatiOn nEEds and thE 
sChOOL-tO-prisOn pipELinE
 The idea behind the youth-specific jurisdiction over status offenses is that states 
have a parens patriae interest in protecting youth who are on a slippery decline toward 
delinquency.11 Status offenses are a special category of noncriminal misbehaviors, 
including truancy, running away, curfew violations, underage drinking, 
ungovernability, and other violations of rules that apply only to children.12
 According to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDPA”), 
since the 1970s, federal policy has been to “deinstitutionalize” status offenders.13 
Status offenders were no longer to be incarcerated in juvenile institutions but diverted 
into alternative community-based programs.14 The reason for this is clear: Congress 
believed that status offenders were best rehabilitated in the community, that the 
juvenile justice system could best spend its resources on more serious offenders, and 
that juvenile court jurisdiction had a significant potential to exacerbate the underlying 
circumstances of status offenders.15 While the incarceration of status offenders has 
declined since this time, 4824 status offenders were incarcerated in public and private 
juvenile facilities in 2003.16 Most of the incarcerated youth were found ungovernable 
(1825), followed by runaways (997), and truants (841).17
11. See Peter D. Garlock, “Wayward” Children and the Law, 1820–1900: The Genesis of the Status Offense 
Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 341 (1979) (explaining the genesis of the juvenile court’s 
status offense jurisdiction); George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent 
or Tyrant?, 25 Depaul L. Rev. 895, 896–98 (1976) (providing an account of parens patriae jurisdiction 
generally).
12. Status offenders have different names in different jurisdictions. Common examples are CHINS, PINS, 
and MINS (child/person/minor in need of supervision), Black’s Law Dictionary 1110 (8th ed. 
2004).
13. See supra note 7.
14. The JJDPA requires that states that accept JJDPA funds progress toward removing status offenders 
from juvenile institutions and develop non-secure alternative programs to address the needs of status 
offenders. Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 223 (a)(12), 88 Stat. 1109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(11)(A)) 
(“[J]uveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if 
committed by an adult, shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities . . . .”).
15. See supra note 7.
16. See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 198 (noting that a majority of status offenders were 
detained in private facilities rather than public facilities).
17. Id. 
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 These numbers, however, do not represent the full extent to which status 
offenders are incarcerated. In 1980, Congress amended the JJDPA to allow juvenile 
courts to incarcerate children “charged with or who have committed a violation of a 
valid court order.”18 This expanded authority means many of the 14,135 children 
incarcerated in secure facilities for “technical violations” may be status offenders.19 In 
some states, technical violations comprise upward of one-third of the in-custody 
juvenile population.20 Reports also indicate that status offenders are often relabeled 
as “delinquent” to keep them housed in secure facilities.21 Some status offenders are 
even committed to mental health facilities.22 Nonetheless, in most adjudicated status 
offense cases countrywide, the juvenile court ordered probation; residential placement 
was the second most-frequent dispositional outcome.23 Those adjudicated 
ungovernable were the most likely to be placed in a residential facility, while truants 
were the most likely of status offenders to be placed on probation.24 Since a significant 
and potentially large number of status offenders are still entering secure facilities, 
much is at stake for a child facing a status offense charge.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(A)(ii) (2006).
19. See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 198.
20. Id. at 205. In Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming at 
least 25% of offenders in custody were in custody for technical violations of probation, parole, or valid 
court orders (“VCO”). Id. at 203. All of these states except New Jersey and Utah have valid court order 
exceptions. See National Youth Rights Association, Survey of State Laws on the Valid 
Court Order Exception to Secure Detention for Status Offenders 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.youthrights.org/forums/downloads.php?do=file&id=374&act=down (summarizing the 
VCO exception rules for each state). The likelihood of status offenders being part of the in-custody 
technical violator population can also be gleaned from a brief glance at the data for states that do not 
have a VCO exception. States without a VCO exception have high status offender populations, while 
states that have low status offender populations have high technical violator populations. For example, 
New York does not have a VCO exception, and 20% of its custody population is status offenders. OJJDP, 
National Report, supra note 1, at 203.
21. See Malcolm W. Klein, Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of Impediments, 
1 Crime & Just. 145, 176–77 (1979) (“In California, the new 1977 law prohibiting secure detention of 
status offenders led to a dramatic police response: up to 50 percent of status offenders formerly arrested 
and dealt with by release, referral, or petition were now ignored by the police, while a small percentage 
of others were relabeled as dependent or delinquent in order to obtain secure detention.”); W. Krause & 
M.D. McShane, A Deinstitutionalization Retrospective: Relabeling the Status Offender, 17 J. Crime & 
Just. 45 (1994) (finding that girls are more likely than boys to be relabeled, formally processed, and 
incarcerated); David J. Steinhart, Status Offenses, 6 Future of Children 86, 91 (1996) (noting that 
relabeling began after deinstitutionalization).
22. See Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission 
Rates, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 773, 798–808 (1988) (arguing that there is an increase in the use of hospitalization 
to control troublesome youth even though they do not suffer from severe mental disorders).
23. See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 191 (“From 1985 through 2002, among adjudicated 
runaway, truancy, ungovernability, and liquor law violation cases, formal probation was the most likely 
disposition.”).
24. See id. at 192 (finding that 160 out of 625 status offenders adjudicated ungovernable were placed in a 
facility).
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 Following the JJDPA, some jurisdictions have implemented community-based 
diversion programs to address status offenses. This development, however, should 
not suggest that diversion is much less serious than the potential for secure detention: 
“Instead of reducing the number of youth formally processed through the juvenile 
justice system, these prevention and early intervention policies actually subject more 
youths to formal justice system intervention.”25 With this formal intervention in 
mind, the Institute for Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association 
(“IJA-ABA”) noted the “corrosive effects of treating non-criminal youth as those that 
had committed crimes . . . .”26 Consequently, youth who are formally processed or 
adjudicated under the status offense jurisdiction face, at best, probationary supervision 
within the community and, at worst, incarceration.
 A. Status Offenders with Unmet Special Education Needs
 Status offenders are likely to be children with undiagnosed and unmet special 
education needs. Any child between the ages of three and twenty-one,27 inclusive, is 
eligible for special education services if the child has a disability and the child requires 
special education and related services due to the disability.28 Moreover, eligibility 
25. Ctr. on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, Widening the Net in Juvenile Justice and the 
Dangers of Prevention and Early Intervention 1 (2001), available at www.cjcj.org/files/
widening.pdf. Worries about formally processing more status offenders are also connected with worries 
about diverting precious public safety and welfare resources from youth in need of intervention to youth 
who are not in need of intervention. See id.
26. Aidan R Gough, Am.Bar.Ass’n., Inst. of Judicial Admin., Juvenile Justice Standards Project, 
Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior 7 (1982), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/83576.pdf. The IJA-ABA also noted: “On common sense grounds, given the lack of 
conclusive empiric data, it seems likely that (1) coercive judicial intervention in unruly child cases 
produces some degree of labeling and stigmatization; and (2) whatever effect this has on the child’s self-
perception and future behavior will be adverse.” Id. The fact that status offense cases are treated similarly 
to delinquency cases is also supported by the data. For example, in 2002, 23% of petitioned delinquency 
cases resulted in residential placement, while 62% resulted in probation. OJJDP, National Report, 
supra note 1, at 174. In comparison, between 1985 and 2002, 26% of petitioned ungovernability cases 
resulted in residential placement, while 66% resulted in probation. Id. at 192. Consequently, 
ungovernability dispositions are strikingly similar to delinquency dispositions. The numbers are similar 
for runaway cases. See id. However, truancy cases and liquor law violation cases follow a different 
pattern. See id.; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967) (“If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have 
been subject to Juvenile Court proceedings. For [using vulgar language in the presence of a woman], the 
maximum punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than 
two months. Instead, he was committed to custody for a maximum of six years.”). 
27. One should keep in mind that the way in which special education law defines “children” is different 
from how juvenile justice statutes define “children” or “ juveniles.” However, there will be significant 
overlap. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 601 (West 2008) (defining “minor” as an individual 
under the age of eighteen). Thus, individuals through the age of twenty-one (i.e., until the twenty-
second birthday) who are under the jurisdiction of the adult criminal court may have special education 
rights. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.101(a), 300.102(a)(1)–(2) (2009).
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a). For limitations on the age coverage of Part B, see 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.102. For example, a state also can constrict the ages of 
eligibility. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(1) (allowing constriction for certain ages where inconsistent with 
state policy or a court order). Nothing in the IDEA limits a state or local government from extending 
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explicitly “include[s] children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled 
from school.”29 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) covers any 
disability that significantly affects a child’s learning and adjustment in school.30
 Children swept into the juvenile justice system are likely to be children with 
unmet special education needs. Studies estimate that the prevalence of youth with 
disabilities in juvenile corrections is between 30% and 70%,31 while only 8.8% of 
public school students have been identified as having disabilities that qualify them 
for special education services.32 Children with disabilities and emotional disturbance 
also have higher arrest rates than their non-disabled peers.33 Moreover, youth in the 
eligibility to cover students past the twenty-second birthday. Michigan, for example, covers students with 
disabilities (who have not graduated from high school) until the age of twenty-five. See Mich. Comp. 
Laws §§ 380.1711, 380.1701, 380.1751 (2008). Special education attorneys should check state laws and 
school district regulations to determine whether the state legislature or local education agency has extended 
eligibility to cover students past the twenty-second birthday. Part B of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411–
1419, covers students between the ages of three and twenty-one. Part C of the act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1445, 
covers early intervention for children under three years of age and for their families.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a). Generally speaking, the IDEA covers students until 
they graduate from high school or until they turn twenty-two, whichever occurs first, and obtaining a 
high school equivalency degree, such as a G.E.D., does not terminate eligibility. See 34 C.F.R. § 
300.102(a)(3)(i)–(iv) (describing specific exceptions, including retaining eligibility for coverage when a 
student is suspended, expelled, or obtains a high school equivalency degree). It is also important to 
know that a child who is advancing from grade to grade and is not failing can be, nonetheless, a “child 
with a disability” covered under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R.§ 300.101(c).
30. A “child with a disability” is a child with “mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), 
speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance 
. . . orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific 
learning disabilities; and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii). States may define a category of “developmental delay” for children between the 
ages of three and nine. Id. § 1401(3)(B). For a child with a disability that does not affect academic 
performance and adjustment in school—a child, for example, with a physical disability or with a chronic 
illness—section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act likely protects the child from discrimination and affords 
the child a right to reasonable accommodations in the school setting. See generally 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.31–
104.39 (listing the responsibilities of schools with respect to students with handicaps generally).
31. See Robert B. Rutherford, Jr. et al., Youth with Disabilities in the Correctional System: 
Prevalence Rates and Identification Issues 10–19 (2002) [hereinafter Rutherford, Prevalence 
Rates]; P. Casey & I. Keilitz, Estimating the Prevalence of Learning Disabled and Mentally Retarded 
Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-analysis, in Understanding Troubled and Troubling Youth 82 (Peter 
E. Leone ed., 1990); Donna M. Murphy, The Prevalence of Handicapping Conditions Among Juvenile 
Delinquents, 7 Remedial & Special Educ. 7 (1986); Robert B. Rutherford et al., Special Education in 
the Most Restrictive Environment: Correctional/Special Education, 19 J. Special Educ. 59 (1985). The 
most recent and comprehensive study estimates that 33.4% of youth in state juvenile correctional systems 
have a disability. See Mary M. Quinn et al., Youth with Disabilities in Juvenile Corrections: A National 
Survey, 71 Exceptional Child. 339, 342 (2005) [hereinafter Quinn, Youth with Disabilities]. However, 
the disability prevalence rates for individual states ranged from 9.1% to 77.5%. See id.
32. See U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., Twenty-third Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation 
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act II-21 (2001), available at http://www2.ed.
gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2001/section-ii.pdf.
33. See Chesapeake Institute, National Agenda for Achieving Better Results for Children 
and Youth With Serious Emotional Disturbance (1994), available at http://cecp.air.org/resources/
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juvenile justice system are more likely to have unidentified disabilities and unmet 
special education needs.34
 Although no data exists regarding the prevalence of disability in status offenders 
as a distinct group, the connection is quite clear. Students with disabilities are more 
likely to be unsuccessful in school and engage in undesirable behavior than their 
non-disabled counterparts; therefore, they are more likely to be charged with 
ungovernability.35 Students who struggle in school because of an education-related 
disability are more likely to be truant, and students with poor school attendance are 
more likely to not be identified as needing special education services when they in 
fact need special education services.36
 The disabilities that a defense attorney will likely find within a status offense 
caseload include specific learning disabilities, speech or language impairments, and 
emotional disturbance. Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) is also 
common and is covered under the IDEA’s definition of “Other Health Impairment.”37
 B. Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Flushed Down the Pipeline
 Congress passed the initial, federal special education law, the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (“EAHCA”) in 1975.38 Two groundbreaking cases, 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC),39 and Mills v. 
Board of Education,40 paved the way for this Congressional action.41 PARC resulted in 
ntlagend.asp; Wagner et al., Youth with Disabilities: A Changing Population (2003), available 
at http://www.nlts2.org/reports/2003_04-1/nlts2_report_2003_04-1_execsum.pdf.
34. See Quinn, Youth with Disabilities, supra note 31, at 342 (“Although the present investigation is a marked 
improvement over earlier studies, in all likelihood the number of students with disabilities in juvenile 
corrections . . . who are actually eligible for special education services is underestimated.”); Burrell & 
Warboys, Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, supra note 2, at 1 (“[Y]outh in the juvenile justice 
system are much more likely to have both identified and undiscovered disabilities.”) (emphasis added).
35. Peter E. Leone et al., Nat’l. Ctr. on Educ., Disability & Juvenile Justice., School Failure, 
Race, and Disability: Promoting Positive Outcomes, Decreasing Vulnerability for 
Involvement with the Juvenile Delinquency System 3 (2003), available at http://www.edjj.org/
Publications/list/leone_et_al-2003.pdf [hereinafter Leone, Promoting Positive Outcomes] 
(“Students with disabilities display higher rates of problem behavior and disciplinary referrals than their 
schoolmates.”).
36. See Rutherford, Prevalence Rates, supra note 31, at 8 (“[M]any [youth in the juvenile justice 
system] may not be identified and labeled by public schools for the simple reason that they seldom, or at 
least sporadically, attend school and complete the special education procedures necessary to receive a 
special education label.”).
37. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9)(i)–(ii) (2009).
38. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§1400–1487 (2005)). The EAHCA 
was the initial version of the IDEA. See William D. White, Where to Place the Burden: Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act Administrative Due Process Hearings, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (2006). 
39. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
40. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
41. See White, supra note 38, at 1015.
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a consent order;42 Mills, a class action in the District of Columbia, resulted in a grant 
of summary judgment for the “exceptional” children excluded from education.43 
Judge Waddy’s description of the problem in Mills left no doubt that the overwhelming 
majority of children with education-related disabilities received no educational 
services from the school system.44 A pervasive part of the problem in Mills was the 
practice of using the pretext of behavior as an excuse for excluding children with 
disabilities from public education.45 Relying on Brown v. Board of Education for the 
proposition that access to education is of central importance,46 Judge Waddy ruled 
that the exclusion of children with disabilities violated equal protection.47 The court’s 
final judgment mandated a number of provisions—substantive rights and procedural 
protections—that later appeared in the EAHCA and the IDEA.48
 In passing the federal special education law, Congress intended to address this 
historical canard of failing to identify and serve children with education-related 
disabilities and using the children’s behavior as a justification for their exclusion. As 
the United States Supreme Court stated in Honig v. Doe,
Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they 
had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly 
emotionally disturbed students, from school. In so doing, Congress did not 
leave school administrators powerless to deal with dangerous students; it did, 
however, deny school officials their former right to “self-help,” and directed 
that in the future the removal of disabled students could be accomplished 
only with the permission of the parents or, as a last resort, the courts.49
The Court noted that one in eight disabled students had been excluded from the public 
school system and many others were warehoused in special programs that were 
ineffective in addressing their education needs.50 This practice is still all too common 
as the data supports the conclusion that students with disabilities are disproportionately 
suspended from schools.51 In particular, students with learning disabilities and 
42. Id. at 1016.
43. Id.; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 873.
44. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868–69.
45. See, e.g., id. at 869 (describing the first two named plaintiffs and how they were excluded, without 
procedural protections, as “behavior problem[s]”); see also id. at 878 (describing procedural protections 
against suspensions and requirement for educational services during period of suspension).
46. White, supra note 38, at 1016 (citing Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874, quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 493 (1954)).
47. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–75.
48. White, supra note 38, at 1016 (citing Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877–83).
49. 484 U.S. 305, 323–24 (1988). As originally passed, the law created no exception to “stay put” for a child 
who is allegedly dangerous. Id. at 323. School officials, however, could appeal to a court for a preliminary 
injunction to seek removal of an allegedly dangerous child. See id. 
50. See id. at 323–24.
51. See Peter E. Leone et al., School Violence and Disruption: Rhetoric, Reality, and Reasonable Balance, 33 Focus 
on Exceptional Child. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Leone, School Violence] (“Mounting evidence suggests that 
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emotional disturbance are overrepresented within the class of students with disabilities 
who are suspended.52 The behaviors for which these students are suspended, moreover, 
are primarily non-violent and do not result in harm to others.53 Consequently, these 
students would be more likely to fall under the status offense system, perhaps by 
receiving a charge of ungovernability, rather than the delinquency system.
 Against this backdrop, one can begin to interpret the increasing prevalence of 
school administrators referring children to juvenile courts for alleged disruptive 
conduct (whether that conduct is classified as a status offense or as a delinquency 
matter).54 Schools referred 73% of the petitioned truancy cases in 2005, and 
approximately 28% of all status offense cases.55 Truancy cases increased by 60% 
between 1995 and 2005.56 So, attorneys defending youth against status offense 
charges continue to encounter schools that fail to address the needs of children with 
education-related disabilities and then attempt to pass these unserved children to the 
juvenile court. Fortunately, federal special education law and state law provide 
advocates with tools to address the growing number of children with undiagnosed 
and unmet special education needs making contact with the juvenile court.
iii.  aggrEssiVE spECiaL EdUCatiOn adVOCaCY in thE faCE Of a statUs 
OffEnsE ChargE
 Federal special education and status offender policy, in conjunction with state 
statutory requirements, make possible effective procedural and substantive challenges 
to status offense petitions.57 Federal and state law and policy create a presumption in 
a disproportionately high percentage (possibly close to 20%) of suspended students are students with 
disabilities, compared to a national proportion of about 11% of students ages 6–21 receiving services under 
IDEA.”). Disproportionate representation is even more pronounced for black, male disabled students. See 
Leone, Promoting Positive Outcomes, supra note 35, at 2 (“[B]lack, male students with disabilities 
were punished more severely than others for commission of the same offense.”).
52. See Leone, School Violence, supra note 51, at 13 (“Several studies demonstrate that students with learning 
disabilities and emotional disturbance are overrepresented among suspended students with 
disabilities.”).
53. See id. (“Several studies have found that the majority of suspension-related behaviors seem to be 
nonviolent and generally do not result in injuries to others.”).
54. See David Richart et al., Building Blocks for Youth, Unintended Consequences: The Impact 
of “Zero Tolerance” and Other Exclusionary Policies on Kentucky Students 26 (2003), 
available at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/kentucky/kentucky.pdf; Civil Rights Project, 
Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School 
Discipline Policies 15 (2000), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/discipline/
final_report.pdf.
55. See Charles Puzzanchera & Melissa Sickmund, Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile 
Court Statistics 2005 82 (2005), available at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/njcda/pdf/jcs2005.pdf.
56. Id. at 72. “Between 1995 and 2005, the petitioned truancy case rate increased steadily (45%).” Id. at 73. 
57. This holds true for attorneys representing children charged with delinquency as well. See generally 
Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Changing the Narrative: Convincing Courts to Distinguish 
Between Misbehavior and Criminal Conduct in School Referral Cases, 9 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 53 (2007); 
Tulman, Disability and Delinquency, supra note 2.
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favor of addressing the needs of a significant proportion of status offenders through 
the special education system rather than the juvenile justice system.58 What follows is 
a roadmap for attorneys concerned with preventing children with unmet special 
education needs from being sent down the school-to-prison pipeline via the status 
offense system. But first, a brief overview of the responsibilities that school officials 
have under federal special education law is in order.
 A. IDEA Obligations
  1. Free and Appropriate Education
 The substantive entitlement in the IDEA is the right to a free appropriate public 
education (“FAPE”).59 FAPE means “special education and related services” that 
meet state standards, in an appropriate school setting, and in accordance with the 
child’s individualized education program (“IEP”).60 The word “free” means that the 
parent does not pay for the child’s services.61 The word “appropriate” is more difficult 
to define and is the focus of a key Supreme Court case, Board of Education v. Rowley.62 
According to the Court, the instruction must be individualized to meet the child’s 
unique needs63 with supportive services necessary to ensure that the child benefits,64 
but “appropriateness” does not require maximizing the child’s educational 
58. Advocates who worry about disproportionate identification of minority students as special education 
students might worry that this article advocates inappropriately casting a child client as in need of 
special services when in fact the child client is not disabled. The article is not advocating this. Instead, 
the article advocates a strategy that addresses unidentified and unmet special education needs that are 
manifest in a status offense charge. Thus, the objective is quite the opposite since it is often a lack of 
special education advocacy and defense that results in poor minority youth moving into the juvenile 
system while their white counterparts, particularly those from upper-income families, do not reach the 
delinquency court or are diverted based on special education considerations.
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (defining “free appropriate public education”).
60. Id. § 1401(9)(B)–(D).
61. Section 1401(9)(A) provides that the services must be “provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and without charge.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A). This right to appropriate services at no charge 
to the parent leads to an important remedy: if the public school placement or services are not appropriate, 
the parent may be entitled to a private school placement or services at government expense. See 34 
C.F.R. § 300.148 (2009).
62. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In Rowley, the Court also underscored the law’s procedural requirement that 
school administrators include the parents in all special education decision making. Id. at 205–06 
(“Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and 
guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process . . . as it did upon 
the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.”).
63. Id. at 207. Toward this end, a child with a special education need will be given an IEP, which is a written 
blueprint of the specialized instruction and other services—e.g., related services, transition services, 
assistive technology, program modifications—that are appropriate for the child. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 
1414(d). For a more detailed explication of IEPs and services available see infra Part IV.A.
64. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (“We therefore conclude that the ‘basic f loor of opportunity’ provided by the 
[IDEA] consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed 
to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.”) (emphasis added).
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opportunities.65 In assessing educational benefit, the inquiry should include not only 
academic progress, but also the child’s adjustment and preparation for life after high 
school.66
  2. Child Find and Evaluation
 The “child find” provision of special education law mandates that school district 
administrators and personnel identify, locate, and evaluate all children with 
disabilities, including homeless children and children who are wards of the state.67
 To determine whether the student has an education-related disability, the law 
provides for an evaluation process68 that addresses “all areas of suspected disability.”69 
A parent can initiate an evaluation by requesting it, or a state or local education 
agency, or other state agency, may initiate a request for an initial evaluation.70 A state 
court meets the criterion of “other state agency,” and, accordingly, a juvenile court 
65. See id. at 198–201 (“[T]o require . . . the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each 
handicapped child’s potential is . . . further than Congress intended to go.”). The fact that a mainstreamed 
child is achieving adequate grades and advancing from grade to grade is a significant, but not necessarily 
dispositive, factor in determining “educational benefit.” Id. at 202–03. For a child in a regular classroom, 
the IEP and individualized instruction should be “reasonably calculated” to facilitate the child achieving 
passing grades and advancing from grade to grade. Id. at 203–04.
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
67. Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1) (2009).
68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)–(c) (mandating a “full and individual” evaluation); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.300–311 
(detailing all aspects of the evaluation process).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4). The evaluation must also be, among other criteria, 
comprehensive, 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(6), nondiscriminatory, id. § 300.304(c)(1)(i), properly 
administered, id. § 300.304(c)(1)(iii)–(v), and in the child’s native language or other mode of 
communication, id. § 300.304(c)(1)(ii). Under the 2004 amendments, a state must permit, and a school 
district may use, a “response-to-intervention” (“RTI”) approach for determining whether a student is 
learning disabled. See id. §§ 300.307(a)(2), 300.309(a)(2)(i), 300.311(a)(7). Through RTI, school 
personnel use interventions with research-based demonstrated effectiveness to address a student’s 
academic deficits. This approach allows early intervention and can help avoid unnecessarily applying the 
“special education” label. A parent is entitled to have the child evaluated for special education eligibility 
and is not required to wait for pre-referral services like RTI. See, e.g., id. § 300.311(a)(7)(ii)(C) (requiring 
that parents be notified that they may request an evaluation).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B). Attorneys and juvenile court officials should appropriately point out this 
option to a parent who files an ungovernability petition against his or her own child. In many cases, 
parents file juvenile court petitions because they have already been rebuffed by schools that resist 
providing behavior and mental health services to children who are entitled to them. See U.S. Gen. 
Accounting Office, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Federal Agencies Could Play a 
Stronger Role in Helping States Reduce the Number of Children Placed Solely to Obtain 
Mental Health Services 30 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03397.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice] (“Some parents 
bypass eligibility restrictions for special education services and procedures for receiving child welfare, 
mental health, and juvenile justice services by petitioning the court to provide mental health and specific 
education services for their child.”).
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judge may request an evaluation.71 Following an initial evaluation and a determination 
of eligibility,72 the school system must reevaluate the child—referred to as a “triennial 
evaluation”—at least once every three years.73 A reevaluation must occur sooner if 
school district personnel determine that the child’s educational or related service 
needs require reevaluation, or if the parent or teacher requests reevaluation.74 Upon 
identifying a child with special education needs, the school must then provide 
appropriate supportive services in the “least restrictive environment.”75
  3. Least Restrictive Environment
 Special education law emphasizes keeping children in, or returning children to, 
the educational mainstream.76 The IDEA’s emphasis on placement in the least 
restrictive environment recognizes that education is meant to integrate students and, 
ultimately, to prepare students to graduate from high school and enter mainstream 
society through post-secondary education or the work world.77 Ideally, therefore, 
schools should place students in integrated schools and in mainstream, regular 
education classes, and may only remove children from regular education settings 
“when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in 
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily.”78
71. An evaluation requires both written notice to the parent of the evaluations to be conducted, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(b)(1), and informed consent from the parent, id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I). Generally, the initial 
evaluation must be completed within sixty days of parental consent. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I)–(II).
72. A parent has a right to obtain an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”) of the child, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(1) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, and the parent has a right to an IEE at public expense if the 
parent disagrees with an evaluation conducted by the school system, id. § 300.502(b). Remarkably, if a 
parent who disagrees with the school system’s evaluation requests an IEE at public expense, school 
system administrators, “without unnecessary delay,” either must grant the request or request a hearing to 
attempt to show that its evaluation is appropriate. Id. § 300.502(b)(2).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.303(b)(2).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.303(a)(1)–(2). School administrators must also 
provide prior written notice, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1), and obtain informed consent from the parent, id. at 
§ 1414(c)(3), before conducting a reevaluation.
75. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
76. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in 
public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled . . . .”).
77. See id. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (requiring that special education students be prepared for “further education, 
employment, and independent living”).
78. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Placement should be as close as possible to the child’s home and, ordinarily, should 
be in the school that the child would attend if not disabled. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)–(c). The school 
district must also have available a “continuum of alternative placements” that includes special classes, 
special schools, home instruction, and the like. Id. § 300.115.
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  4. Discipline Protections
 Any child, without regard to disability, who is facing even a short-term exclusion 
from school, has a right to due process.79 When removal of a child with an education-
related disability for ostensibly disciplinary reasons is for a longer period, and thus 
constitutes a “change in placement,” the procedural safeguards of the IDEA are 
activated.80 Removal of a child with special education needs from school for more 
than ten days constitutes a “change in placement” under special education law.81 Such 
a “change in placement” triggers procedural protections82 to ensure that the authorities 
are not removing a child with a disability in a manner that is discriminatory83 or for 
behavior that is a manifestation of the disability.84 If the behavior is not a manifestation 
of a disability, school authorities may discipline a child with a disability as they would 
a non-disabled child,85 except that the child nevertheless maintains the right to 
participate in the general education curriculum and progress toward meeting the 
goals their IEP, although perhaps in a different setting.86 A child with a disability 
does not lose the entitlement to special education and related services, even if excluded 
from school.
 A child with a disability sent to an interim alternative education setting or a 
child with a disability suspended or expelled for conduct that was not a manifestation 
of the disability has a right, as appropriate, to a functional behavioral assessment and 
a behavior intervention plan, as well as a right to modifications in the IEP to address 
the behavior that led to the disciplinary exclusion from the current educational 
placement.87
79. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (”Students facing temporary suspension have interests 
qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause . . . .”). Due process requires some kind of notice 
and hearing, as well as an explanation of the evidence and an opportunity to be heard. Id.
80. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504(a), 300.530(h).
81. 34 C.F.R. § 300.536(a)(1) (removal for more than ten consecutive days); id. § 300.536(a)(2) (removal for 
more than ten days that are not consecutive but that constitute a pattern creating a change in placement). 
Even a short suspension from school of ten days or less requires some due process protection. Goss, 419 
U.S. at 581. 
82. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(H); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(h) (2009).
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(1).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)–(F); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e)–(f); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(K)(1)(E)(i)(I)–(II); 
34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e)(1)(i)–(ii) (noting that conduct is a manifestation if the disability caused, or 
substantially and directly related to, the conduct; or the conduct is a manifestation if it directly resulted 
from failure to implement child’s IEP).
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(c).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(i). If the behavior is a manifestation of the 
child’s disability but the behavior was having a weapon or illegal drugs in school or if the behavior 
caused serious bodily injury to another person in school, school authorities may remove the child to an 
interim alternative educational setting for no more than forty-five days. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G); 34 
C.F.R. § 300.530(g).
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(ii).
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 Of course, the school can decide to include appropriate behavioral interventions 
in the IEP at any time to prevent or to address a child’s behavioral problems. For a 
child with serious behavioral concerns, those that are manifesting in status offenses 
or delinquent offenses, schools are obligated, under federal law, to develop and adopt 
a protocol of individualized, positive behavioral interventions and supports.88
 For a child who has not previously been identified as eligible for special education 
and who is facing suspension or expulsion, a parent can successfully assert rights to 
procedural protection under the IDEA if school personnel “had knowledge . . . that the 
child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary 
action occurred.”89 The school personnel are deemed to have had knowledge if the 
parent previously raised concerns about the child’s need for special education, if the 
parent previously requested an evaluation, or if the child’s teacher or other school 
personnel expressed concerns about the child’s pattern of behavior to supervisors.90 
Regarding a child not previously identified and about whom school personnel did not 
have knowledge that the child has a disability, a parent who requests a special education 
evaluation has a right to an expedited evaluation if the child is being subjected to 
disciplinary sanctions.91 If the team determines, based on the expedited evaluation and 
other input, that the child has an education-related disability, then the child is protected 
under the IDEA (including its discipline protections), and school system personnel 
must provide special education and related services.92
 B. Status Offenders and Schools Avoiding IDEA Obligations
 In a small number of reported status offense and delinquency cases, attorneys 
have argued, successfully and unsuccessfully, that school personnel sought juvenile 
court intervention to circumvent or make an “end run” around their obligations under 
federal special education law.93 Successful cases resemble Honig, except that they 
involve law enforcement and the juvenile court rather than exclusion only. Because 
the IDEA requires exhausting administrative remedies before appealing to a state or 
88. If parents or attorneys are working with a school to address a child’s behavior problems, the protocol 
should contain an explicit agreement to avoid, except in extreme circumstances, calling the police and 
referring the child to the juvenile court.
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534.
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(B)(i)–(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(b)(1)–(3).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d)(2)(i).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d)(2)(iii). For challenges to special education 
decisions that involve a disciplinary change in placement, including a challenge to a manifestation 
determination, the law provides for an expedited hearing. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(3), (4)(B); 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 300.532(a), (c)(2). School officials can seek an expedited hearing to seek to exclude from the current 
educational placement a child with a disability whom they allege to be a danger to self or others. 34 
C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(2).
93. See, e.g., In re Trent N., 569 N.W.2d 719, 738 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (“[I]f the school is truly engaging in 
an ‘end run,’ that concern can be addressed at the various investigative and referral levels within the 
juvenile court system which determine whether the case belongs in the juvenile system in the first 
instance, and, if so, how it should be processed.”).
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federal court,94 the juvenile court is not the correct forum in which to litigate IDEA 
eligibility and denial of a FAPE, nor is it the right forum to challenge the propriety 
of suspending and expelling students with disabilities. However, an attorney should 
use a special education hearing to challenge a school administrator who fails to 
comply with the IDEA and then files a status offense petition against a child. Morgan 
v. Chris L. is such a case.95
 While schools can refer students to law enforcement, schools should not refer 
students to law enforcement for status offenses as a substitute for providing parents 
and students with the procedural and substantive protections of the IDEA.96 In 
Morgan v. Chris L., the Sixth Circuit upheld an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) 
decision that a school district violated the IDEA when it filed a juvenile court 
petition against a student with ADHD because he broke a school bathroom pipe.97 
The Sixth Circuit found that the school had violated the procedural requirements of 
the IDEA by filing a petition in the juvenile court before evaluating the student in a 
timely fashion, before initiating a special education team meeting to address the 
behavior, and before initiating what the court believed to be a “change in placement.”98 
Consequently, the court upheld the ALJ’s ruling directing the school to dismiss the 
juvenile court petition that it had filed.99
 Subsequent to the Chris L. case, Congress, in the 1997 IDEA amendments, 
clarified that federal special education law does not constrain agencies (including 
schools) from referring alleged criminal activity by a child with a disability to proper 
authorities, nor does the law keep police and courts from handling such matters:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prohibit an agency from 
reporting a crime committed by a child with a disability to appropriate 
authorities or to prevent State law enforcement and judicial authorities from 
exercising their responsibilities with regard to the application of Federal and 
State law to crimes committed by a child with a disability.100
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), (l); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(a), (e).
95. 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), aff ’d, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997). A distinguishing feature of 
Morgan v. Chris L. is that Tennessee’s statutes authorize school-initiated petitions in the juvenile court, 
whereas in most states, school officials must rely upon juvenile court personnel to file a petition. See 
Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 725; accord Commonwealth v. Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d 883, 886–87 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2002). Tennessee now prohibits school officials from filing a petition against a special 
education student unless they first find that the alleged behavior was not a manifestation of the child’s 
disability. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-10-1304(b)(3)(B) (2008). 
96. See infra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
97. No. 94-6561, 1997 WL 22714, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1997). Not all cases of this sort, in particular 
Chris L., involve status offense. But the form of the violation of the IDEA is the same, as well as the 
form of argument that defense attorneys should use.
98. See id. at *4–6.
99. Id. at *1.
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(A) (this provision was originally codified, following the 1997 amendments, at 
1415(k)(9)(A)). One might presume that Congress meant for subsection 1415(k)(6)(A) to cover 
“delinquent acts” and “status offenses,” as well as “crimes.” The language is significant considering 
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 Courts and commentators have misunderstood the relationship between the 1997 
amendments and Chris L.-like cases, believing that the amendments “implicitly 
rejected” the reasoning of Chris L.101 and that Chris L. was “effectively overruled.”102 
This view reflects a misunderstanding of the procedural history of Chris L. Nothing 
in the federal special education law before or after 1997 suggests that Congress 
intended to restrict or otherwise interfere with the work of police officers,103 probation 
officers, prosecutors, and judges.104 In passing the 1997 amendments, Congress was 
not changing the substance of the law, nor was it overruling the reasoning behind 
Chris L. Rather, Congress was reaffirming the central holding of Honig—that 
schools cannot unilaterally exclude troublesome students as a substitute for meeting 
their substantive and procedural obligations under federal special education law.
 Chris L. was a special kind of case. At the time, Tennessee school officials were 
able to directly file a “petition” against a child in juvenile court.105 This power is 
distinct from the mere power to report a crime, and instead is akin to pressing 
charges against a child and initiating juvenile court jurisdiction over the matter. 
Thus, in Chris L. there are two important and related points. First, Chris L. focused 
on whether an ALJ can order school officials to seek dismissal of a juvenile court 
petition initiated by the very same school officials. Consequently, Chris L. did not 
federal status offender policy generally. Whether to argue that the omission of these terms is significant, 
on the other hand, is left, for present purposes, to the judgment of the individual attorney.
101. Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d at 887.
102. Joseph M. ex rel. Kimberly F. v. Se. Delco Sch. Dist., No. CIV. A. 99-4645, 2001 WL 283154, at *6 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2001).
103. The role of police officers—particularly those assigned to public schools and “school resource officers”—
presents issues that are beyond the scope of this article. Minimally, attorneys should consider the possibility 
of negotiating agreements within IEP meetings that would preclude school administrators from 
summoning or countenancing police intervention concerning behaviors that are manifestations of the 
child’s disability, and that should be addressed with behavioral plans and IDEA related services. Obviously, 
such agreements should explicitly exclude serious and violent delinquent or criminal behavior. 
104. As noted above, the Supreme Court ruled in Honig that Congress meant to end the practice of schools 
unilaterally excluding children with disabilities, and particularly children with emotional and behavioral 
issues, under pretextual and unfair applications of school discipline procedures. Honig, 484 U.S. at 
323–24. Congress has not retreated fundamentally from its intention to prohibit school administrators 
from unilaterally excluding children with disabilities. Accord Gun-Free Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)
(1) (2006) (requiring states that receive federal education money to have a state law requiring local 
education agencies (“LEAs”) to expel any student bringing a firearm to school or possessing a firearm 
in school; the state law, however, can allow the chief of a LEA to modify expulsion on a case-by-case 
basis). Subsection (c), furthermore, is a “special rule” providing that “[t]he provisions of this section shall 
be construed in a manner consistent with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act . . . .” Id. § 
7151(c). In this regard, the more significant amendment to the IDEA in 1997 was the addition of a 
“dangerousness” exception that allows school administrators, in three specific circumstances, to place a 
student with a disability in an interim alternative educational setting for up to forty-five days. Id. § 
1415(k)(1)(G); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(g). If the behavior, though, is not a manifestation of the disability, 
then school administrators can discipline the student as they would discipline a student who is not 
disabled, except that the special education student continues to have a right to receive a FAPE. 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(1).
105. See Chris L., 927 F. Supp. at 269.
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address whether schools could report crimes to law enforcement. Thus, Chris L. is 
consistent with the final outcome of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA. While the 
amendments permit reporting a crime, the Department of Education explained that 
this is distinct from what took place in Chris L.: “[t]he Act does not address whether 
school officials may press charges against a [child with disabilities] when they have 
reported a crime by that student.”106 Accordingly, the Chris L. court was merely 
reiterating the prohibition articulated in Honig against the practice of schools 
unilaterally excluding children with disabilities for reasons related to the school’s 
failure, under federal special education law. School administrators cannot “end run” 
their special education responsibilities.
 Even if a school refers a student to the juvenile court, they are still required to 
satisfy their procedural and substantive obligations under the IDEA.107 In specific 
instances, an ALJ should order school officials to seek dismissal and work within the 
framework of the IDEA. To serve a child charged with a status offense adequately, 
therefore, the attorney—in addition to defending the child in juvenile court—should 
assert rights affirmatively in a special education administrative due process hearing 
and, if necessary, in a subsequent civil litigation.108 One might think of this strategy 
as turning a defendant into a plaintiff.109
 The second point addressed by Chris L. is that a school that has the ability to 
directly file a petition in juvenile court essentially has the power to bypass the 
gatekeeping function of an intake officer and a juvenile prosecutor. In this way, the 
power to file a juvenile court petition is the power to manipulate the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court. This distinguishes Chris L. from other cases involving whether 
the juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction before the IDEA due process review is 
completed. For example, in Trent N., a state appellate court pointed out that the 
IDEA does not generally circumscribe the jurisdiction of the juvenile court but 
instead is directed at school action.110 Thus, the IDEA due process requirements 
operate “parallel” to juvenile court jurisdiction.111
106. Larry D. Bartlett, Special Education Students and the Police: Many Questions Unanswered, 185 Educ. L. 
Rep. 1, 4 (2004)(citing and quoting from Attachment 1—Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 12537, 12631 (Mar. 12, 1999)).
107. See, e.g., Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724 (“The school’s responsibility under the IDEA, to provide disabled 
children with an appropriate education, does not end when a child enters the juvenile system. Both case 
law and statutes support the proposition that the IDEA continues to work even when a child is involved 
in juvenile court proceedings.”).
108. The juvenile defense attorney can learn special education law and practice, or, alternatively, the defense 
attorney can help the child’s parent locate a capable special education attorney who is willing to provide 
the representation. Assuming that the family is indigent or has little income, the special education 
attorney should be prepared to provide representation based upon a retainer agreement through which—
consistent with legal ethics—the attorney and client identify the attorney’s hourly rate, but, nevertheless, 
rely upon the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA.
109. See generally Joseph B. Tulman, The Best Defense is a Good Offense: Incorporating Special Education Law into 
Delinquency Representation in the Juvenile Law Clinic, 42 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 223 (1992).
110. See Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724.
111. Bartlett, supra note 106, at 2.
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 However, the Trent N. court rightly observed that cases in which schools can 
directly petition the juvenile court are distinct.112 In Trent N., only the district attorney 
could invoke jurisdiction by initiating proceedings.113 This jurisdiction, furthermore, is 
only exercised after the juvenile court, and the district attorney in particular, have 
complied with their statutory investigative and referral requirements.114 Consequently, 
a school administrator who, in regard to a particular student, fails to comply with the 
IDEA and then files a status offense petition against that child is arguably warping the 
jurisdictional balance struck between the juvenile court and the IDEA administrative 
review. In this way they are abusing their petitioning authority.
 Although attorneys likely will not encounter binding case law authority on this 
question, one fair interpretation of section 1415(k)(6)(A) of the IDEA is that a special 
education hearing officer cannot prohibit a school administrator from referring a 
child to the juvenile court. On the other hand, a hearing officer in a special education 
matter is absolutely empowered to rule upon whether school personnel failed to serve 
the child appropriately and failed to follow the IDEA’s procedural requirements, as 
well as on whether the alleged behavior is a manifestation of the child’s disability.
 The juvenile court, of course, can obtain and maintain jurisdiction over a child in 
a status offense matter notwithstanding the fact that school officials are satisfying 
their obligations under the IDEA but nonetheless refer a special education student to 
the juvenile court. Such a case, however, should be rare. In passing the IDEA, 
Congress did not intend to supplant the states’ “general welfare and supportive 
services for children.”115 Recognizing that Congress sought to protect children with 
disabilities from school removal, the New York Court of Appeals in In re Beau II 
found no evidence that school authorities sought to change a child’s placement by 
filing a status offense petition; rather, the court found that the school sought to 
reinforce the child’s participation in the school’s IEP.116 The student was not attending 
school, and, therefore, school off icials were having diff iculty successfully 
implementing his IEP. The court found that, in regard to the child’s special education 
needs, the status offense action was “compatible and supportive.”117 It is important, 
consequently, to recognize that in some cases the juvenile court has an interest in the 
welfare of children that is coextensive with the interest that Congress and well-
meaning school officials have in the welfare of a child.
112. See Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 725 (“Wisconsin schools do not have statutory authority to initiate juvenile 
petitions.”).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 725 n.9 (“A juvenile referral may be subject to various levels of review before and after a 
petition is filed.”).
115. In re Beau II, 95 N.Y.2d 234, 240 (2000) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176) (habitual school tardiness).
116. See id. at 239–40. 
117. Id. at 240. It has also been found that a status offense case was not an improper effort to change the 
educational placement of a suicidal child where there was an IEP meeting to evaluate placement needs. 
In re Charles U., 837 N.Y.S.2d 356 (3d Dep’t 2007).
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 Along these lines we can begin to understand the proper relationship between 
schools and the juvenile court with respect to status offenders. While schools can refer 
students to the juvenile court, schools cannot initiate juvenile court jurisdiction as a 
substitute for their own IDEA obligations. Schools, despite referring students with 
disabilities to law enforcement, are still obligated to satisfy the procedural and 
substantive requirements of the IDEA. Finally, schools should be encouraged, and 
perhaps are obligated, to seek juvenile court intervention when juvenile court 
intervention is necessary for successful implementation of the school’s obligations under 
the IDEA, for example, in cases where children are not attending school and the school 
has identified and attempted to implement robust interventions to address the student’s 
education needs, including addressing why the student is not attending school.118
 The defense attorney typically is appointed to represent the child after the filing 
of a status offense petition (or even after the child’s failure in a status offense diversion 
program). In order to negotiate a dismissal of the petition or to effectively challenge 
the intake process, the attorney must rapidly uncover the facts and legal claims that 
are germane to both the status offense matter and the parallel special education case. 
The special education advocacy process, however, often will require several months, 
particularly if the child was not previously evaluated and identified as eligible for 
special education. For this reason, the defense attorney is not usually in a position 
early in the defense of a status offense case to present to the juvenile court a hearing 
officer’s determination establishing a denial of a FAPE.
 Given time constraints, a more manageable strategy is to negotiate a continuance 
of the status offense matter to help the parent use special education processes—e.g., 
an IEP meeting or a due process hearing—to line up appropriate services for the 
child and for the family that will supersede the perceived need for the status offense 
proceeding.119 A defense attorney would be well-advised, therefore, to present a 
hearing officer’s findings and rulings in the child’s favor on these particular issues to 
probation officers, prosecutors, and judges in the juvenile system for the purpose of 
having the charges dropped, the argument being that the child should not be 
118. Cf. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 735(d)(iii) (McKinney 2009).
 [W]here the entity seeking to file a petition is a school district or local educational 
agency, the designated lead agency shall review the steps taken by the school district or 
local educational agency to improve the youth’s attendance and/or conduct in school 
and attempt to engage the school district or local educational agency in further diversion 
attempts, if it appears from review that such attempts will be beneficial to the youth.
 Id.
119. See ACLU of Washington & TeamChild, Defending Youth in Truancy Proceedings: A 
Practice Manual for Attorneys 75 (2008), available at http://www.teamchild.org/pdf/Truancy%20
Manual%202008.pdf [hereinafter Defending Youth] (recommending that defense counsel file motion 
for stay or seek a joint request for continuance of status offense matter in order to address reasons for 
truancy); cf. In re Ruffel P., 582 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (permitting two continuances 
on a hearing on defense counsel’s motion to dismiss in order to await special education decision making 
by the IEP team). But cf. In re C.S., 804 A.2d 307, 309 (D.C. 2002) (noting that trial court that first 
ordered and awaited submission of IEP did not abuse its discretion by conducting disposition hearing 
without receiving or considering the IEP).
896
ShUTTiNG oFF The SchooL-To-PriSoN PiPeLiNe
responsible for the failings of school officials and that the child’s best interest is 
served by seeking the IDEA services.
 C. Discriminatory Actions Prohibited by the A.D.A. and the Rehabilitation Act
 If evidence shows that school officials are referring children with disabilities to 
the juvenile court on the basis of behavior for which officials are not referring non-
disabled children, the defense attorney should consider advancing an argument, 
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)120 or section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act,121 that the status offense prosecution is discriminatory:
Of course, it would be a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 if a school were discriminating against children with disabilities in how 
they were acting under this authority (e.g., if they were only reporting crimes 
committed by children with disabilities and not [those] committed by 
nondisabled students).122
Schools would effectively be tainting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with 
schools’ own discriminatory actions. Juvenile court officials should be worried about 
this given that a state court or local law enforcement can be considered to be a 
“program or activity receiving federal financial assistance” for purposes of section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.123 Consequently, if the juvenile court does a proper 
investigation of the status offense complaint and finds evidence of discriminatory 
practices, it should be wary about continuing with a status offense petition for fear of 
itself engaging in a discriminatory practice. If the court does not do a sufficient 
investigation, it is failing to satisfy its own state law investigatory obligations.
 If the court investigates and there is evidence that school officials are not 
satisfying their IDEA obligations toward a child before the court, in some states, the 
court may order school officials to comply with their obligations under the IDEA.124 
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”).
121. Rehabilitation Act of 1976, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
122. 64 Fed. Reg. 12406, 12631 (Mar. 12, 1999).
123. See, e.g., Doe v. Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1136–37 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that a police department 
fell under section 504 in an action alleging discrimination based on HIV status); Greater Los Angeles 
Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175, 179–81 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that a judicial 
system could be considered a recipient of federal financial assistance under section 504).
124. The way in which the juvenile court exercises jurisdiction over school officials seems to vary by 
jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, the court may, following notice and an opportunity to be heard, join 
school officials as party to the juvenile court proceedings. E.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 727(a) 
(2008) (“To facilitate coordination and cooperation among governmental agencies, the court may, after 
giving notice and an opportunity to be heard, join in the juvenile court proceedings any agency that the 
court determines has failed to meet a legal obligation to provide services to the minor.”). In some 
jurisdictions, it seems, the court can exercise jurisdiction merely by ordering school officials to do 
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This may include an order to evaluate a child,125 or an order to provide appropriate 
services.126 Unfortunately, in some jurisdictions, the juvenile court may only exercise 
jurisdiction over school officials after the child is adjudicated a status offender.127 In 
these jurisdictions, attorneys should negotiate a continuance of the status offense 
proceeding to help the parent use special education processes to put in place appropriate 
services for the child that will supersede the need for a status offense adjudication.
 D. State Statutory Obligations of Intake Officers
 A primary purpose of the juvenile court is to divert children away from being 
processed through the criminal justice system.128 One unique feature of the juvenile 
court is often unrecognized: the duty and ability of intake probation officers to divert 
youth away from being processed by the juvenile justice system.129
 State statutes generally reflect the historical importance of the intake process in 
at least one of two ways. First, intake officers are generally charged with a duty to 
something. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.18(1) (West 2006) (“After . . . a petition for delinquency has 
been filed, the court may order the child . . . to be evaluated by a psychiatrist or a psychologist, by a 
district school board educational needs assessment team, or, if a developmental disability is suspected or 
alleged, by a developmental disabilities diagnostic and evaluation team . . . .”).
125. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B) (“[A] State educational agency, other State agency, or local educational 
agency may initiate a request for an initial evaluation to determine if the child is a child with a 
disability.”). The power to order evaluation does not vary by jurisdiction.
126. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 727 (2008) (“The court has no authority to order services unless it has 
been determined through the administrative process of an agency that has been joined as a party, that 
the minor is eligible for those services.”).
127. See La. Child. Code Ann. art. 779(C) (2004) (“In any case in which the family has been adjudicated 
to be in need of services, the court may order any public institution or agency and its representatives to . . . 
[p]rovide any services specified in its order as necessary to improve the family relationships or reunite 
the family in the best interests of the child . . . .”).
128. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2477, 2479 
(2000) (“This promotion of juvenile court as a diversion from criminal justice is distinct from more 
ambitious programs of ‘child saving’ intervention because avoiding harm can be achieved even if no 
effective crime prevention treatments are available.”).
129. See Charles Lindner, Probation Intake: Gatekeeper to the Family Court, 72 Fed. Probation 48 (2008), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/June_2008/13_probation_intake.html [hereinafter 
Lindner, Probation Intake]. Judge Julien W. Mack stated that:
 It is the last thing to do with the wayward child to bring him into any court. The wise 
probation officer will save him from the court . . . . Of course in the end some will have 
to be brought into court. That court is successful in its work that has the least number 
of cases.
 Id. at 49 (internal citation omitted). Judge W. Waalkes wrote that:
 Intake is a permissive tool of potentially great value to the juvenile court. It is unique 
because it permits the court to screen its own cases . . . . It can cull out cases which 
should not be dignified with further court process. It can save the court from subsequent 
time consuming procedures to dismiss a case . . . . It provides machinery for referral of 
cases to other agencies when appropriate and beneficial to the child.
 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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investigate complaints. Second, upon investigating, intake officers are charged with 
a duty to use discretion in weighing whether to recommend that a formal petition be 
filed, that the case be diverted to another agency, or that the case be dismissed. 
Federal special education policy should meld with these requirements to make special 
education considerations centrally important at the intake and referral stages of the 
juvenile court process.
  1. Investigative Requirements
 Probation officers in most jurisdictions are charged with a statutory duty to 
investigate status offense referrals. The investigative duty is articulated differently 
throughout jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions require that a probation officer conduct 
a “preliminary inquiry.”130 Other jurisdictions impose a legal obligation on the intake 
officer to “examine complaints,”131 “[i]nvestigate all cases referred,”132 and “[r]eceive 
and examine written complaints.”133
 Some jurisdictions are very specific about the required extent of an intake officer’s 
investigation. Florida, for example, requires that youth be “screened” for “[t]he 
presence of medical, psychiatric, psychological, substance abuse, educational, or 
vocational problems, or other conditions that may have caused the child to come to 
the attention of law enforcement or the department” and for “whether the child 
poses a danger to himself or herself or others in the community.”134 Some jurisdictions, 
however, are not specific about the investigative requirements for intake officers.135
 Experience strongly suggests that probation officers are not fully, or even seriously, 
investigating status offense referrals from schools to determine whether school 
officials have failed to provide appropriate special education services.136 Similarly, 
probation officers rarely, if ever, contemplate the applicability and potentially salutary 
effects of appropriate special education services for a child with disabilities who is the 
subject of a status offense referral for ungovernability vis-à-vis the child’s parents. 
Most probation officers are not even aware of the vast services that are potentially 
available to children with special education needs.
 Whether school administrators are attempting an “end run” of their special 
education responsibilities and whether the child facing charges has an undiagnosed 
education-related disability should be considered at the “investigative and referral 
130. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 39E (2008); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62C.100(1)(b) (2007); Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 7-301 (2006). 
131. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-24.2(2) (2008).
132. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-237(A) (2008).
133. Ala. Code § 12-15-118(1) (2005).
134. Fla. Stat. § 985.145(1)(c)(2) (West 2006).
135. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-24.2 (specifying no specific investigatory requirements).
136. For example, as one scholar has noted, “[i]ntake dispositions are often determined by the previous 
offense.” Lindner, Probation Intake, supra note 129, at 49.
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levels” of the delinquency process.137 Intake probation officers therefore should be 
investigating whether a school is failing, intentionally or not, to meet its obligations 
under the IDEA, and whether the juvenile court is the best place for a child referred 
for a status offense. Recognizing the responsibility of intake officers to investigate, 
Congress required that agencies referring children to the juvenile court should 
transmit special education and disciplinary records.138 At the point of intake, state 
law—requiring probation officers to screen out inappropriate cases139—meshes with 
the congressional mandate that school authorities provide relevant school records to 
the court.
 If an intake officer fails to investigate properly and fails to recognize the 
significance of special education violations by school personnel, the attorney can 
provide school records and explain to the intake officer—and subsequently, if 
necessary, to the prosecutor —that the case is really an unfair attempt by school 
officials to transform a failure to evaluate and to provide special education services 
into a dispute in the juvenile court. Moreover, given the explicit congressional 
mandate to provide relevant school records, even if not required explicitly by the state 
investigative requirements, a sufficient investigation should require that intake 
officers investigate school records. In the event that an intake officer does not, an 
attorney should file a motion to dismiss the petition based on violations of the 
statutory investigative process.
  2. Failure to Exercise Discretion
 Intake probation officers typically are also empowered by statute to examine 
complaints to consider whether to commence a proceeding against a child.140 The legal 
duty for intake officers to exercise discretion also comes in many forms depending on 
the jurisdiction. Intake officers are required to determine the “appropriateness” 141 of 
137. Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724. 
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(B) provides: “An agency reporting a crime committed by a child with a disability 
shall ensure that copies of the special education and disciplinary records of the child are transmitted for 
consideration by the appropriate authorities to whom the agency reports the crime.” Id. The transfer of 
records is subject to the protections of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”). See 
Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d at 888 (holding that transfer is permitted by FERPA).
139. See generally Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 284 (1984) (describing New York’s intake process).
140. See Model Act, supra note 5, § 6 (withdrawn from recommendation for enactment as obsolete) 
(specifying that the “[p]owers of the probation officer” include “mak[ing] investigations, reports, and 
recommendations to the juvenile court; receiv[ing] and examin[ing] complaints and charges of 
delinquency, unruly conduct or deprivation of a child for the purpose of considering the commencement 
of proceedings . . . [and] mak[ing] appropriate referrals to other private or public agencies of the 
community if their assistance appears to be needed or desirable . . . .”); D.C. Code § 16-2305 (2009) 
(requiring that intake probation officer recommends whether to file petition; notifies complainant of 
recommendation not to file, and that complainant may appeal to the prosecutor). Thus, the intake 
probation officer can delay, block, or divert a complaint and, essentially, refer the matter to the public 
agency—the school system—that sent it to the court.
141. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.145.
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juvenile court actions taken and to make only “appropriate”142 referrals. Implicit in 
these requirements is that intake officers, beyond their investigative duties, exercise 
judgment based on their investigative findings with respect to a case.
 Some jurisdictions are more explicit and specific about what is required of an 
intake officer exercising discretion. For example, Pennsylvania requires that intake 
officers “should balance the interests of the victim and protection of the community, 
imposition of accountability on the juvenile for offenses committed, and the 
development of competencies for the juvenile.”143 Nevada requires that intake officers 
“determine whether the best interests of the child or of the public” require formal 
processing or informal adjustment.144 Accordingly, through investigation and 
decision-making requirements, probation officers are required to function as 
gatekeepers to the juvenile court, screening out cases that are inappropriate for 
juvenile court intervention.
 Despite being charged with statutory obligations to investigate and exercise 
discretion, intake officers do not exercise, or exercise only in a limited fashion, this 
decision-making role.145 Rather than pushing back, probation officers tend to “go 
with the f low” of the school-to-prison pipeline.146 Evidence of this increasing 
derogation is found in the fact that the number of petitioned status offense cases 
increased 29% between 1995 and 2005.147
 Congress, recognizing the gatekeeping function of the juvenile court, intended 
for the special education needs of a child to be a factor in the decision-making of 
juvenile court officials. For this reason, Congress mandated that a child’s educational 
records be forwarded to the court. In light of the federal policy to deinstitutionalize 
status offenders, to address the needs of students with disabilities in the least 
restrictive environment, and to stop school officials from unilaterally excluding 
children with disabilities from school, one should conclude that Congress also 
intended that a child’s special education needs would be a significant, and perhaps 
determining factor at the intake stage of a status offense matter.
 While a court will not assume that intake probation officers and prosecutors will 
“rubber stamp” a referral by school authorities, the court can use its supervisory 
authority to correct the error if intake probation officers and prosecutors misuse or 
142. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-308 (2009); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-24.2.
143. 33 PA.B. 1581 (emphasis added).
144. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62C.100.
145. See, e.g., Lindner, Probation Intake, supra note 129.
146. A nearly identical analysis applies, of course, to prosecutorial decision making. Prosecutors are charged 
with determining whether the child’s and the community’s interest weigh in favor of proceeding with a 
status offense case. The prosecutor should be acting to ensure the accountability of school administrators 
who seek to refer special education students for status offense prosecutions. 
147. Puzzanchera & Sickmund, supra note 55, at 72. Status offense petitions formally processed by the 
juvenile court also rose from 4.1% to 4.8%. Total petitioned status offense case rate increased 17% 
between 1995 and 2005. Id. at 73.
901
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
abuse their discretion.148 As appropriate, based upon the specific facts of a case, 
defense attorneys should use special education considerations to convince (1) probation 
officers to recommend against petitioning or to divert the child from prosecution; (2) 
prosecutors to refuse to charge or to agree to divert; or (3) judges to dismiss or divert 
cases at the outset, to refuse to take a plea, to find the child “not guilty” at trial, or to 
dismiss at disposition.
 An intake probation officer who is fully informed of special education entitlements 
should rarely recommend petitioning a status offense case against a child who is 
eligible for special education. Nevertheless, the defense attorney must be prepared to 
challenge the decision making of, or failure to exercise discretion by, the intake 
officer.149 The attorney can file a motion to dismiss the petition based on violations 
of the statutory intake process.
 E. Substantive Judicial Rulings
  1. In Need of Rehabilitation
 Like probation officers and prosecutors, judges ultimately must determine 
whether a child—even if unruly or truant—is “in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” 
For example, in the Model Juvenile Court Act, the definition of “unruly child” (like 
the definition of “delinquent child”) requires both the deviant conduct and a separate 
finding of a “need for treatment and rehabilitation.” 150 The definition is conjunctive, 
and the prosecutor must prove both elements.
 Representing a child who has access to appropriate and comprehensive services 
within the special education system, a defense attorney will be in a strong position to 
rebut any presumption that the child is in need of treatment through the juvenile 
court. The availability of appropriate services from the special education system, 
which are summarized below, signifies that the child is not in need of treatment or 
rehabilitation from the juvenile system or through the court’s auspices. In many cases, 
if school officials were acting with fidelity in regard to the child’s IDEA rights, the 
child would not present as having an unmet need for treatment or rehabilitation. On 
this basis, the attorney can move at any point during the proceedings to dismiss the 
petition or move at trial for a judgment of acquittal.151
148. See Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724
149. See generally Joseph B. Tulman, The Role of the Probation Officer in Intake: Stories from Before During and 
After the Delinquency Initial Hearing, 3 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 235, 235–50 (1995) (discussing 
responsibilities of an intake officer prior to an initial hearing).
150. Model Act, supra note 5, § 2(4). But cf. In re M.C.F., 293 A.2d 874, 877 (D.C. 1972) (finding rebuttable 
presumption that delinquency adjudication establishes need for care and rehabilitation). 
151. This is consistent with recent recommendations of the United States General Accounting Office to 
Congress regarding how better to reduce state juvenile court costs associated with placing juveniles for 
purposes of receiving mental health services, which must be provided in appropriate circumstances by 
schools under the IDEA. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice, 
supra note 70, at 31 (identifying misunderstanding of school IDEA obligations as one reason why 
juvenile courts are burdened with inappropriate and costly cases).
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  2. Best Interests of the Child
 Beyond substantive requirements to prove the need for rehabilitation, judges, like 
probation officers and prosecutors, have inherent authority to consider the best 
interests of the child—as well as safety of the community—in handling status offense 
cases.152 In some states, a juvenile court judge can grant a motion to dismiss in the 
interest of justice and in the best interest of the child, assuming that the judge finds 
that the dismissal does not jeopardize the safety of the community.153 A judge who is 
aware of the special education needs of a child and who is aware of the extensive 
services available for that child should find that the best interests of the child are 
served by the special education system rather than the juvenile court.
 Services available through special education law are extensive, while the services 
available through the juvenile court are limited. Attorneys with knowledge of the 
services available under the IDEA can argue that a status offender is not in need of 
rehabilitation from the juvenile court because appropriate rehabilitative services are 
available within the community, or that the best interests of the child are better 
served through the special education system. What follows is an extensive summary 
of the services available under the IDEA.
iV.  sErViCEs thrOUgh thE idEa in COntrast With sErViCEs thrOUgh thE 
JUVEniLE COUrt
 The range of mandatory, when appropriate, services available through the special 
education system is greater and superior to the range of interventions currently 
available through the juvenile court. In the special education system, services are 
specialized, regularly evaluated, collaborative, preventative, and cost efficient. 
Moreover, responsibility for improvement is not placed solely on the shoulders of 
children; rather, responsibility is distributed between those giving and those receiving 
the services. Juvenile court intervention should be sought only when needed to 
effectively implement the services available under the IDEA.
152. Essentially, judges are required “to provide a simple judicial procedure . . . in which the parties are 
assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced . . . .” 
Model Act, supra note 5, § 1(4). Other legal rights include special education rights, and the simplest 
and fairest process often would be to eschew status offense proceedings and to ensure that the child is 
receiving appropriate services through the school system and other public agencies in order to succeed at 
school and at home.
153. See, e.g., In re Robert T. Doe, 753 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2002) (relying upon juvenile court’s 
inherent authority to dismiss status offense matter in the interest of justice); Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 725 
(recognizing, in dictum, that trial court could have dismissed the petition in the best interest of the child 
but holding that trial court ruled on legal grounds instead). This inherent authority is also articulated in 
the purpose clauses of many state juvenile court acts. See, e.g., La. Child. Code Ann. art. 801 (2004) 
(“The purpose of this Title is to accord due process to each child who is accused of having committed a 
delinquent act and . . . to insure that he shall receive, preferably in his own home, the care, guidance, and 
control that will be conducive to his welfare and the best interests of the state . . . .”); Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 119, § 53 (2008) (“Sections fifty-two to sixty-three, inclusive, shall be liberally construed so that the 
care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible 
that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not 
as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.”).
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 A. Individualized Education Programs
 An IEP is a written blueprint of the specialized instruction and other services—
e.g., related services, transition services, assistive technology, program 
modifications—that are appropriate for a particular special education student.154 The 
IEP must present the child’s current academic levels and functional performance, 
include annual goals, and specify how the child’s progress toward the goals will be 
measured.155 An IEP team consists of the child’s parents, the child’s regular education 
teacher and special education teacher, a school district representative, a person 
qualified to interpret evaluation results, other individuals with knowledge of special 
education or the child whom the parents or school system representatives invite, and, 
whenever appropriate, the child.156 The IEP team must review and revise the IEP at 
least annually.157 Notably, the law specifically charges the IEP team with considering 
services to address a child’s disruptive behavior: “The IEP Team shall . . .[,] in the 
case of a child whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others, consider 
the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to 
address that behavior . . . .”158 The IEP team must also consider strengths of the 
child, evaluations of the child, concerns of the parents, and, of course, “the academic, 
developmental, and functional needs of the child.”159
 B. Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports
 Congress found that, based upon almost three decades of research and experience, 
the effectiveness of education for children with disabilities improves with the 
provision of whole-school approaches, including positive behavioral interventions 
and supports.160 The IEP Team can order a functional behavioral assessment, leading 
to the design and implementation of a behavioral intervention plan.161
 C. Related Services
 A related service is “transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services as [are] required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from 
154. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d).
155. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
156. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
157. Id. § 1414(d)(4); see also id. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (requiring that an IEP be in place at the start of the school 
year).
158. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
159. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(i)–(iv).
160. See id. § 1400(c)(5)(F).
161. See id. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(i) (IEP Team shall consider positive behavioral 
interventions and supports); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii) (functional behavioral assessment and 
behavioral intervention services for child removed to interim alternative educational setting).
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special education,”162 and includes, in essence, anything that supports the student’s 
ability to learn and to benefit from education. The federal regulations specifically 
identify, among other things, speech-language pathology163 and audiology services,164 
and physical165 and occupational therapy.166 Of particular relevance for children 
facing status offenses and for their families are the following related services:
•	 	Recreation—assessing	 leisure	 function;	 providing	 therapeutic	
recreation services; providing recreation both in schools and 
arranging recreation through community agencies; and educating 
the child regarding appropriate leisure activity;167
•	 	Counseling	Services—providing	 services	 from	 “qualified	 social	
workers, psychologists, guidance counselors, or other qualified 
personnel . . . ;”168
•	 	Parent	Counseling	and	Training—helping	parents	to	understand	
their child’s special needs, informing parents about child 
development, and assisting parents to acquire skills necessary to 
support implementation of the IEP;169
•	 	Psychological	 Services—evaluating	 the	 child,	 planning	 and	
managing a program of psychological counseling for the child 
and the parents, and helping to develop positive behavioral 
intervention strategies;170 and
•	 	Social	Work	Services	in	Schools—studying	the	child’s	social	or	
developmental history; conducting group and individual 
counseling with the child and family; addressing, along with the 
parents and others, all aspects of the child’s life that affect 
performance in school; engaging school and community resources 
to enhance the child’s ability to benefit from the educational 
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.34 (specifying further “related services”). The requirement to 
provide related services includes medical services by a licensed physician only for purposes of diagnosis 
or evaluation. See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (holding that 
catheterization is not covered because it is not diagnostic or evaluative). Moreover, the statute excludes 
from coverage “a medical device that is surgically implanted . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(B). 
163. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(15).
164. Id. § 300.34(c)(1).
165. Id. § 300.34(c)(9). 
166. Id. § 300.34(c)(6). 
167. Id. § 300.34(c)(11). 
168. Id. § 300.34(c)(2).
169. Id. § 300.34(c)(8). 
170. Id. § 300.34(c)(10). 
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program; and helping to develop positive behavioral intervention 
strategies.171
Under special education law, any of these services that are appropriate for a particular 
child with a disability must be provided, at no charge to the parent, by or through 
the public school system.172
 D. Transition Services
 For students turning sixteen years old and older, the IEP team must consider and 
include transition services in the IEP.173 Special education law requires school 
personnel to prepare students with disabilities for success after completing high 
school,174 and, by definition, “transition services” must be:
[A] coordinated set of activities . . . within a results-oriented process . . . 
focused on improving the academic and functional achievement . . . to 
facilitate the child’s movement from school to post school activities, including 
postsecondary education, vocational education, integrated employment 
(including supported employment), continuing and adult education, adult 
services, independent living, or community participation . . . .175
Further, transition services must be individualized according to the child’s needs and 
in consideration of “the child’s strengths, preferences, and interests . . . .”176 School 
personnel must facilitate the development of work and other post-school objectives, 
and must provide specialized instruction, related services, and community experiences 
that facilitate the transition objectives.177 Accordingly, although school personnel can 
engage other agencies to provide transition services, the school personnel must 
reconvene the IEP team to develop alternative strategies if other agencies fail to 
provide transition services.178
171. Id. § 300.34(c)(14). 
172. The IDEA also requires the provision of assistive technology devices and services when appropriate to 
increase, maintain, or improve the child’s functional capabilities. Id. at § 300.324(a)(2)(v); see also 20 
U.S.C. § 1401(1)–(2).
173. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (requiring a plan for transition services, including annual 
updates); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(b) (mandating IEP team to include transition services for children 
younger than sixteen, if appropriate).
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (characterizing the purposes of IDEA to include preparing children with 
disabilities “for further education, employment, and independent living”).
175. 34 C.F.R. § 300.43(a)(1). 
176. Id. § 300.43(a)(2). 
177. Id. § 300.43(a)(1)–(2). Transition services also include, in appropriate circumstances (e.g., students with 
cognitive impairments), training in daily living skills and providing a functional vocational evaluation. 
Id. § 300.43(a)(2)(v). 
178. Id. § 300.324(c)(1). 
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 E. Limited Services are Available through the Juvenile Court
 The juvenile justice system has limited and typically ineffective services to address 
the behavior and needs of status offenders. In most adjudicated status offense cases, 
the court orders probation; residential placement is the second most frequent 
dispositional outcome.179 Of all status offenders, those adjudicated ungovernable are 
the most likely to be placed in a residential facility, while truants are the most likely 
of status offenders to be placed on probation.180 An honest appraisal of probation, 
however, is that it generally provides minimal services to youth and is a mechanism 
by which status offenders can be set up to commit a technical violation. The primary 
intervention available through the juvenile court seems to be the threat of incarceration 
and incarceration itself.
 Admittedly, nothing in the IDEA excludes from coverage, or diminishes the 
rights of, children with education-related disabilities who are detained or incarcerated 
in delinquency facilities. However, using incarceration to provide status offenders 
with IDEA services offends federal policy of deinstitutionalizing status offenders, 
mainstreaming students with disabilities in the least-restrictive environment, and 
limiting the authority of school officials to unilaterally exclude students with 
disabilities.
 A defense attorney with knowledge of the range of available services available 
through the IDEA can bring this information to the attention of the juvenile court 
judge and ask for a continuance to help the parent use special education processes to 
line up appropriate services for the child and for the family that will supersede the 
perceived need for the status offense proceeding. The defense attorney can later 
present the services provided for in the IEP as superior to any intervention that the 
juvenile court could provide. In this way, the attorney should be able to rebut the 
presumption that the child’s rehabilitation is contingent upon the intervention of the 
juvenile court. The juvenile court, however, should appropriately intervene where 
intervention can help school officials and parents achieve the goals of an IEP.
 Based upon success in the special education due process hearing, including 
arranging an appropriate placement and any of the above services, one can anticipate 
that the prosecutor or judge will agree to dismiss the status offense matter. If not, the 
defense attorney can introduce into the status offense proceeding the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law by the special education hearing officer, which may 
demonstrate that school personnel have violated the IDEA, that the child’s behavior 
underlying the status offense charge is a manifestation of the child’s disability, and 
that the hearing officer has ordered appropriate school-based services for the child. If 
the juvenile court judge maintains, in the face of the special education findings, that 
the child is “guilty” of the status offense charges and is in need of treatment and 
rehabilitation from the juvenile system or that a disposition is in the best interests of 
a child, the defense attorney—having introduced the special education findings and 
order—will be in a strong position to appeal.
179. See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 192.
180. See id.
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V. COnCLUsiOn
 A status offense charge suggests that the child is in a crisis situation at school, at 
home, or both. For children with disabilities that affect education, the IDEA services 
should be sufficient to address the conditions that lead to a status offense referral for 
truancy or disruptiveness at school. Further, with regard to a child whose education-
related disabilities also affect relationships at home, special education services should 
be in place to ameliorate the behaviors underlying a status offense referral for 
ungovernability. A juvenile defense attorney who provides special education 
representation can obtain appropriate services for clients and often extricate those 
clients from juvenile court. Problems that developed over a period of years will not 
recede and dissipate immediately. The attorney should maintain the special education 
representation until the child is making satisfactory progress academically and 
emotionally. To be sure, the attorney also has to be keen to the possibility of schools 
merely paying lip service to their special education responsibilities and continuing to 
provide ineffective services. Through effective special education advocacy, attorneys 
can help prevent students with education-related disabilities from being f lushed 
down the school-to-prison pipeline.
